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ABSTRACT
The idea that massive natural resource endowments would lead countries to weak
economic growth and development is counterintuitive. Oil, gas, copper, gold or other
resource riches should, at least in theory, spearhead countries with such natural wealth to
growth that parallels non-commodity-based economies and help them achieve high-income
status. This has not been the case for majority of the endowed countries particularly in
North Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. With few exceptions, such as Norway,
Botswana, Chile or Australia, the resources proved to be a curse.
I begin with a survey of previous academic literature and research on the effects of natural
resources on a given country's economic, social and political development. I then move to
exploring the many challenges and pitfalls faced by resource-based economies. Such
concepts as the Dutch Disease, Rentier State, Governance and Corruption are discussed.
In the final section, outline different methods of the resource curse management by first
exploring monetary and fiscal policies, and later touching upon the issues of responsible
governance. I conclude by proposing a multi-step framework for resource management.
Thesis Supervisor: Roberto Rigobon
Professor of Applied Economics
MIT Sloan School of Management
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Introduction
Men of a fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas
contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence
careful, vigilant, and industrious.
- Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, 1955
I became first interested in the topic of natural resource endowments and their effects on
governments and societies while studying for Bachelors of Arts in Political Science at
Fordham University in New York. Throughout my academic inquiry I read much about
histories and evolutions of political systems of countries across the globe. I have been
always struck by how poorly developed some of the most resource-endowed nations were,
and by the vast income gap between the ruling elite and the citizens. During my senior
year at Fordham, I conducted a semester-long research on the oil dependence of Iraqi
economy where I came to a conclusion that the massive oil and gas wealth was like a curse
to the country. While I was unable to prove a causal relationship between the resource
endowment and poor economic development, the correlation was clear. My interest in the
topic has further intensified during internships at the United Nations in New York and at
the European Parliament in Brussels. Through this thesis I continue satisfying my
unquenched fascination with the complex concept of the resource curse.
Year 2011 has woken up to major social unrests in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and several
demonstrations, albeit muted, in Iran and Iraq. Apart from vast social and economic
inequalities, authoritarian forms of government and relative unsophistication of the
economic base, these all countries depend heavily on their natural resources riches to
generate fiscal rents and employment opportunities within the society.
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Natural resources endowment has historically been one of the key factors determining a
given country's growth. Throughout centuries the commodity "blessing" has been a
source of massive wealth, from a gold-rich Brazil in 1600s to oil-abundant Middle East of
the present time. Yet, the abundance of natural resources has not always translated into
riches for the country's inhabitants, nor into robust economies and citizen friendly forms of
government. In this thesis I seek to inquiry into the phenomenon that many has labeled
"the commodity curse." Namely, has natural resource been more of a curse or blessing
given the vast discrepancy of economic, political and social progress amongst commodity-
rich countries? I seek to determine why certain countries such as Norway, Chile and
Botswana have been able to surpass in terms of economic growth and civil liberties other
commodity-endowed nations, mostly found in Latin America, North Africa and the Middle
East. For example, why Norway with export revenues from oil and gas amounting to 45%
of total exports and constituting 20% of total GDP has been so successful in exploiting its
natural resources and passing down the wealth onto the citizens while Libya, with a quarter
of GDP made up of domestic oil revenues, has fared much worse, to say the least? In light
of volumes of academic literature written on the subject, answered to these questions have
proven difficult, if not elusive. There are however common mistakes that commodity-rich
nations seem to commit, and examples of successful as well as failed policies abound. The
next section explores the many challenges faced by countries endowed with resource
riches, and the mistakes they commit when managing such endowments. The following
chapter explores potential monetary, fiscal and governance remedies to the resource curse.
The Commodity Curse or Blessing?
All in all, I wish we had discovered water.
- Sheik Ahmed Yamani, Oil minister, Saudi Arabia
It is the devil's excrement. We are drowning in the devil's excrement.
- Juan Pablo Perez Lafonso, Founder of OPEC
To refer to a vast, valuable energy resource as the source of a "disease" sounds rather
ungrateful.
- The Economist on the Netherlands
Since 1980s political scientists and economists have produced a flood of research
examining the long-term effects of the natural resource wealth on a given country's
economic development. The research points to the fact that countries abundant in oil,
natural gas, mineral deposits or other valuable natural resources do not necessarily outgrow
economically resource-poor counterparts. The East Asian economies of Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, Japan or Hong Kong achieved high-standard of living without the presence of
exportable natural resources. On the other hand, oil and mineral-rich African countries
such as Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Libya are on the bottom of economic
development league tables in spite of the commodity wealth. For decades inhabitants of
such countries continue to experience low quality of life and low levels of income per
capita. It was not until 1993 that Richard Auty first coined the term "resource curse" in an
academic article attempting to explain the lagging behind in economic development (in
addition to higher economic and political inequality) by resource-rich countries. He
concluded that possession of oil and other commodities curses a country.
Others were quick to follow Auty's rhetoric. Amongst many, Moises Naim, a popular a
Venezuelan writer and columnist, stated in the Foreign Policy Magazine:
Oil is a curse. Natural gas, copper, and diamonds are also bad for a country's
health. Hence, an insight that is as powerful as it is counterintuitive: Poor but
resource-rich countries tend to be underdeveloped not despite their hydrocarbon
and mineral riches but because of their resource wealth. One way or another, oil
-- or gold or zinc --makes you poor. This fact is hard to believe, and exceptions
such as Norway and the United States are often used to argue that oil and
prosperity can indeed go together. (Naim 2010)
The resource curse phenomenon is not universal. Norway quickly comes to mind as a
model country for the exploitation of natural resources. As the world's eighth natural gas
and twelfth oil producer, Norway tops the international league tables for governance and
economic performance. Similarly, Botswana, world's top three diamond exporter is
amongst the best performers in Africa in terms of democracy, stability and income levels
per capita. Contrast it to Congo, another world's major diamond exporter, and the
numbers look bleak. Twenty-seven of the thirty-six states in the World Bank's most
troubled category severely indebted low-income countries are primary commodity
exporters. Nigeria, despite being Africa's highest oil producer netting approximately $350
billion in oil revenues in the past 35 years, experienced 30% decline in per capita GDP
from in the period of 1965 to 2000. Similarly, Venezuela's terms of trade increased by
13.7% per year during 1970-1990 due to oil exports while the GDP per capita fell by 1.4%
per year. In spit of the two year sharp increase in oil price in 1979, Venezuela's
government actually run a current account deficit because of a massive jump in public
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spending. Even in Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, the GDP per capita in
1999 was lower than the figure before the 1970s oil spikes.
In addition, the OPEC member states in the period between 1965 and 1998 experienced on
average a 1.3% contraction in the gross national product while the rest of the developing
world recorded a 2.3% GNP growth (Gylfason 2001). In the period of 1965-1998, the per
capita GNP growth was on average -1% per year in Iran and Venezuela, -2% in Libya, -3%
in Iraq and Kuwait, and -6% in Qatar (Gylfason 2005). More worryingly, several studies
have shown that the probability of engaging in a military conflict (civil war or conflict
between nations) increases with the presence of natural resources (Worse & Collier 2003).
It remains puzzling why resource-abundant countries like Nigeria, Mexico, Venezuela or
the Gulf States have not historically sustained a rapid economic growth even though they
have been resource-rich for a prolonged period of time.
These examples form a consistent pattern. Out of 65 resource-rich countries only four
attained a combination of long-term investment exceeding 25% of GDP on average
between 1970 and 1998 (which equals that of successful non-commodity, industrial
countries) and per capita GNP growth above 4% per year over the same period. The four
countries are diamond-rich Botswana, and three Asian countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand.
For countries abundant in resources, the importance of revenues stemming from the
exploitation of such wealth is clear. Three-quarters of countries in the sub-Saharan Africa
and two-thirds of states in Latin America, the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East
depend on primary commodities such as oil, gas, minerals and precious metals for as much
as half of their export income (Deacon 2010). For example, commodity producing
countries in Latin America derive on average 24% of total fiscal revenues from
commodities compared with 9% for the advanced resource-rich economies (Sinnott, Nash
& de la Torre 2010). There is still no definite agreement as to what may cause such a
counterintuitive phenomenon, but it is important to take stock of the empirical evidence
before attempting to explain the causes.
A number of past studies support the idea that the cure in fact exists. With few exceptions,
the resource-abundant states have stagnated in economic growth since the early 1970s. The
phenomenon is not easily explained by other variables, or by alternative ways to measure
resource abundance. Empirical studies are not bulletproof, but they do present quite
convincing arguments based on historical data. One of the earliest studies done by Nankani
in 1980 shows that the leading hard-rock mineral exporters had a per capita GDP growth
rate of 1.9%, which was half the rate of non-mineral control group of states. Another study
from 1984 showed a negative correlation between the share of hard-rock minerals in total
exports and the economic performance of thirty African states (Wheeler 1984). Similarly,
a study by the World Bank examining economic performance of major oil exporters and
mineral exporters during the 1971-83 boom years showed that the commodity-rich
countries performed less well than their resource-poor counterparts (Gelb 1988; Auty
1993). In 1995, Davis confirmed the previous conclusions. The resource rich states of
Latin America fell behind resource-poor East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s.
It was not however until 2001 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner's comprehensive
study of ninety-seven countries over a nineteen-year period, using regression analysis to
measure the impact of mineral and other resource exports on GDP growth that a much
gloomier picture emerged. In their "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth",
the two economists show that countries with a high ratio of commodity exports to GDP in
1971 had abnormally slow growth rates between 1971 and 1989. Even after controlling for
a wide range of variables such as per capita income, investment rates, trade policy,
geographic region, impact of export and price volatility, income distribution and
bureaucratic efficiency, the correlation remained significant. The study survives a long list
of control variables. The study further stipulates that a one standard deviation increase in
the primary products export share reduced a country's growth rate by 0.6 to 1.5 percentage
points.
The following figure, taken from Sachs and Warner's 2001 article in the European
Economic Review, shows that virtually none of the extremely resource-rich countries in
1970 managed to grow rapidly for the next 20 years. Interestingly, most of the countries
studied (with Malaysia, Mauritius and Iceland as the only exceptions, and not that strong
exceptions for that matter) that did in fact grow rapidly started as resource poor, not
resource abundant.
Growth and natural resource abundance 1970-1989 (Sachs & Warner 2001)
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The findings of the study seem to be counterintuitive and to run against a universal belief
that many current high-income countries developed with the aid of their natural resources.
The natural resource curse seems to contradict the story of growth. For example, it is a
common belief that the abundance of resources in North America in 19th century explains
why the US surpassed England during that period (Habakkuk 1962). The abundance of
natural resources is seen as beneficial for certain developing countries. Formner President
Clinton in 2000 declared that "With ... vast human and natural resources, a revitalized
Nigeria can be the economic and political anchor of West Africa2
Sachs and Warner question the validity of the above argument stating that:
2 From remarks on signing of a Joint declaration with Nigerian President Obasanjo, August 26, 2000.
(Obtained from CNN.com transcripts.)
Although the data are scarce, when one measures natural resource intensity using
historical data, the ratios as a percent of GDP are much smaller than the ratios that
many countries have achieved in the mid-to-late 20th century. Sweden, Australia
and the United States in earlier times never approached the level of natural
resource intensity we see today in the Gulf-States. (Sachs & Warner 2001)
Several scholars have recently questioned the findings of the study stating that the use in
empirical work of commodity exports' share of total exports or GDP as a measure of
dependence in regressions explaining growth pose problems of endogeneity (Sinnott, Nash
& de la Torre 2010). Namely, one cannot say if the countries in question were unable to
grow because of their dependence on commodities or because they were not able to grow
any other of their economic sectors they became dependent on commodities. Also, it have
been argued that the notion of the natural resources course is overgeneralized, and that it
primarily applies to countries with poor governance, which in turn negatively impact
economic growth, and to countries abundant in oil and minerals (Collier & Goderis 2007).
Others have argued that the link between natural resources dependence and growth is
indirect (van der Ploeg & Poelhekke 2009). Even some statistical studies have shown no
evidence of the curse (Delacroix 1977; Davis 1995; and Herb 2005). But a 2009 research
by Alexeev and Conrad found a positive effect of oil and mineral wealth on income per
capita in East Asian and Latin America.
It is reasonable to say that there is still no clear cut consensus on whether the natural
resources wealth hinders economic development. One of the reasons why some studies
come to different conclusions might lie in the fact that while a commodity wealth my
increase to some extent a per capita income level, it may simultaneously reduce or fail to
rise the growth rate of income. Also, as have been noticed for a long time, resource
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abundant countries do not tend to develop highly diversified economies. The 18 th century
French philosopher Montesquieu seemed to have right pointed out that "in countries where
nature easily bestows her bounty, there is little incentive to engage in other, more
burdensome productive activities and that this "indolence" leads to the failure of the
country to develop." This in itself may not necessarily be a bad thing as it could be to the
advantage of the given country to specialize and develop a comparative advantage in a
given industry. The intricacies associated with the so called "Dutch Disease" will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Statistically however, on average resource-rich countries do typically experience slower
growth, are less economically diversified, have more corruption, oppression and
government opacity, are subject to greater economic volatility and are more prone to
internal conflicts than their non-abundant counterparts with comparable income levels.
Resource-rich states, coincidentally, are also overwhelmingly autocratic, a trend further
explored in the next chapter. Regardless of arguments over the linkage of natural
endowment and economic growth, non-resource rich countries on average seem to be fare
better.
The question at the end is not whether natural resources abundance will in the future hinder
economic development of a given country. Commodity abundance does pose numerous
risks to a country, which if not properly managed may bring it to a brink of collapse. It
would not be advisable for countries to either not develop their natural wealth or that it
would be better off ridding itself of the oil. As Norway or Australia has shown oil and
mineral rich countries can succeed provided one can make the best use of the natural
endowment. The issue seems to lie in how to make the best use of such wealth so a
country turns out as Botswana rather than Bolivia or Chile rather than Congo. Much
seems to also depend on the particular circumstances of a given country and on the type of
resource abundance present.
Challenges and Pitfalls of Resource-Based Economies
Is there such a thing as having too much oilfor the country's own good?
- Ricardo Housmann and Roberto Rigobon, 2002
If... oil revenue is managed well, it can educate, heal and provide jobs for ... the people.
But oil brings risks as well as benefits. Rarely have developing countries used oil money to
improve the lives of the majority of citizens or bring steady economic growth. More often,
oil revenues have caused crippling economic distortions and been spent on showy projects,
weapons and Paris shopping trips for government officials.
- New York Times, 1/08/2000
The natural resources curse is multidimensional in nature. Vast differences exist in the
commodities extracted ranging from base metals, precious metals, energy products to
agricultural products. In spite of diverse and varied circumstances of every commodity-
abundant country, there are commonalities across the board when it comes to exploration
and management of the natural resources endowment. The curse does not manifest itself
merely in terms of economic distortions (the "Dutch Disease" discussed below), but also in
it has strong cultural, institutional and political dimensions that breed inadequate
transparency, corruption, protectionism, and, in many cases, instability and violent power
struggles. An inquiry into the commodity curse merits inspection of each of these
considerations. While for the purpose of discussion the resource challenges and pitfalls are
explored separately, it is important to remember that they all are intertwined in one way or
another.
Prices of commodities globally tend to follow cycles. There seem to be overall agreement
amongst policymakers, economists and academia on the typical pitfalls that many of the
commodity-rich countries succumb to. Despite this prevailing knowledge and "role
model" countries, decade after decade governments tend to commit the same mistakes.
This chapter discusses the challenges and pitfalls associated with a high resource
endowment. One can divide the negative effects of natural resource exploration on a given
country into direct: the Dutch Disease, and indirect: rent-seeking, corruption and
governance deficiencies. Next chapter moves beyond the pitfalls to discuss ways of
effective resource management and prevention of the pitfalls.
The Dutch Disease
One of the most prevailing reasons for long-term economic stagflation of commodity-rich
countries is the so called "the Dutch Diseases3". The phenomenon refers to the damaging
effects on the economy that the exploitation and export of natural resources bring about.
Such effects include domestic currency appreciation and changes in the cost of factors of
production. The term was first coined after the experience of the Netherlands since 1959
when a discovery was made of a large natural gas reservoir on the Dutch territory. By
1976 the country recorded revenues of $2 billion along with $3.5 billion of savings in
imports. However, with record revenues and import savings gross corporate investment
had dropped by 15% in 1970s, while employment in manufacturing had declined by 16%.
The total level of unemployment had increased from a modest 1.1% to 5.1%, while the
share of profits in national income which had averaged 16.8% in the 1960s had fallen to
3.5% in the first half of the 1970s.
3 The term "Dutch Disease" was first used by The Economist in 1977
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Why then in light of a massive revenue windfall that the natural gas bonanza had brought
about did the Dutch economy suffer? In a nutshell, there are two effects that typically
follow revenue windfalls from natural resources: appreciation of the local currency and
tendency of the booming sector to draw capital and labor away from non-booming sectors,
such as agriculture and manufacturing, hence raising their production costs (Deacon 2010).
The country's exchange rate should appreciate because foreigners are purchasing the
natural resources and, as the national revenues rise government spending (also called
"spending effect") on such sectors as health, welfare or military follow, which in turn
should affect the wages (Corden & Neary 1984). During the energy price boom of 2001-
2008, in the fixed-rate exchange regime oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia the
real rate appreciation came through money inflows and inflation. In the floating-rate
exchange regime countries such as Chile, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Kazakhstan or South
Africa, the real appreciation came through the appreciation of nominal currency. Under
the fixed exchange regime, the domestic money supply should increase because of the
commodity-induced surplus on the balance of payments. The inflow of reserves and the
increased money supply often leads to inflation and overheating (Frankel 2010). For
instance, a 2005 study by Frankel (2005) of the Kazakh currency Tenge and his subsequent
2007 study of the South African Rand suggest a relationship between the real prices of
each country's commodity, oil for Kazakhstan and minerals for South Africa, and their
exchange rates. Typically, the currency falls when the prices of natural resources are
declining and appreciates when prices boom, as was the case between 2002-2006.
The second Dutch Disease effect concerns crowding out of non-commodity sectors, rising
their productions costs and rendering them less competitive. Multiple studies by Sachs and
Warner show the impact of positive wealth shocks creating excess demand for non-traded
products and driving up non-traded prices, including input costs and wages (Sachs &
Warner 1995, 1999; Sachs 1996). Accordingly, manufacturing, or other sector that
produces traded products, suffers profits squeeze because of high priced non-traded
products that are essentially manufacturing inputs. Because manufacturing products are
typically sold on international markets with competitive price levels, such products'
competiveness suffers. In 1970s, the Dutch manufacturers forced to use overpriced
domestic inputs and export products were outcompeted by lower-cost foreign companies.
The declining manufacturing can lead to further ramifications on the growth of a given
economy depending on the importance and size of such sector. Consequently, the
commodity export bonanza discourages diversification of non-commodity exports
subjecting country to future shocks shall prices follow boom and bust cycles, which they
always do.
Gylfason (1999, 2000)4 goes further arguing that the natural resource abundance does not
only crowd out non-commodity activity, it also crowds out entrepreneurial activity and
innovation. Namely, if wages in the commodity-booming sectors rise high enough to
attract entrepreneurs and potential investors, they will be discouraged by rent-seeking
government officials who are also drawn to such sectors by high and concentrated
revenues. State officials will therefore be tempted to crowd out innovators and
entrepreneurs and rent-seek on their own putting a dent to pro-growth activities. The
predatory state crowds out the development state. State officials, having the regulatory and
legal authority, can successfully discourage entrepreneurs from entering the wealthy, albeit
fixed, space of commodity exploration. Natural resource countries, the author argues,
would therefore experience lower innovation, lower entrepreneurial activity, poorer
governments and lower growth.
In a nutshell, the two effects combined lead to a decline in exports in the non-booming
sectors due to higher exchange rate, to the corresponding higher costs of goods becoming
less competitive in the world markets, and to an increase in prices of domestic goods and
services (due to higher wages) that cannot be imported. Consequently, a country becomes
even more dependent on natural resources and their revenue windfalls. Accordingly,
because almost every commodity-based country is a price taker of commodities, it
becomes vulnerable to the commodity price fluctuations. The countries are price takers
because commodities of one country do not differ that much from commodities of another
country; they can be easily substituted. Hence, such tradable goods' prices are usually set
on world markets.
But why this phenomenon should be seen as a problem? Could one not argue that a
resource boom ultimately brings about a windfall of revenues that should make the per
capita income levels higher? Shouldn't then such countries adjust to the "blessing" and
specialize in its exploitation, even if the discovery shifts their comparative advantage away
from other sectors such as manufacturing? In practice, however, there is widespread
concern that the contraction of a manufacturing sector, which typically follows
natural resource discoveries, is a bad thing. The worry seems to be that when the
natural resources run out or when the production diminishes, the lost manufacturing
sectors will not come back (Krugman 1987) and the overall economic activity of a
country will suffer. Specialization in the extraction of natural resources proves difficult in
light of wide commodity price fluctuations. Since most countries are price takers, they
have little influence over the volatile revenue streams. There are ways to hedge price
fluctuations, but they come at a cost and, if designed and implemented improperly, may
lead to losses. Shifting away from manufacturing, or any other industry base for that
matter, can be detrimental to the economy:
If the natural resources begin to run out or if there is a downturn in prices,
competitive manufacturing industries do not return as quickly or as easily as they
left. This is because technological growth is smaller in the booming sector and the
non-tradable sector than the non-booming tradable sector. Since there has been less
technological growth in the economy relative to other countries, its comparative
advantage in non-booming tradable goods will have shrunk, thus leading firms not
to invest in the tradable sector. (Van Wijnbergen & Sweder 1984)
Corden and Neary (1982) have also argued that a resource boom will create the "resource
movement effect." The shifting production landscape will increase the demand for labor in
the booming sector. This effect is however negligible considering the fact that while in the
Middle Eastern countries, oil and natural gas account for more than 80% of government
revenues, these sectors typically employ less than 10% of the country's workforce. Mining
and hydrocarbons are capital-intensive businesses, employing relatively few. This
staggering disproportion may explain the prevailing double digit unemployment rates in
the region. According to the United Nations Development Program, the average
unemployment rate is 15% in the Arab world reaching 40% among people between the
ages of 15 and 25, totaling 66 million out of the total Arab population of 317 million. The
development of natural resources has not resulted in a widespread improvement in
employment levels in commodity-rich countries. Specialization in the exploitation of one
or a few commodities leads to a sprawling public sector and underdeveloped private sector.
Inevitably, this may lead to high income inequality as the overextended public sector
provides much of the employment opportunities, while private sector lags behind. The
public sector is however unable to absorb all or most of the job seekers.
Furthermore, because of price volatility in the commodity markets and the corresponding
uncertainty about revenue streams, firms may be reluctant to invest denting economic
growth. The issue of investment disincentive is especially relevant in exploration of
mineral and energy resources because of high up front investments and long, often
uncertain, time horizons for cash flows. Additional investment risks encompass state price
controls and threats of nationalization. Due to the high sunk costs and political risks, the
governments will often dominate the resource exploitation. In such cases, private
investment is difficult to come by even though Sachs and Warner (1997), in one of their
studies, have found little evidence that resource abundance was associated with lower
investment.
It is however easy to imagine a situation where it becomes more profitable to attempt to
gain a share of the wealth being generated by that one resource industry, rather than engage
in more entrepreneurial activity and commit investments in other industries. The
incentives of attempting to gain a foothold in an already tested and highly profitable
commodity enterprise are high, often outweighing potential benefits of venturing to other
sectors. Because the resource industry's growth is constrained by external factors such as
the size of reserves or the rate at which they can be explored, more resources put into the
sector will not expand it, as they would in other industries. When the size of the pie is
fixed, people compete for a larger share instead of deriving profits from increasing the size
of the economy.
The Dutch Disease discussion is incomplete without mentioning the effects of booming
sector revenues on domestic fiscal spending, which eventually become unsustainable and
politically difficult to curtail. The volatility of commodity-induced income may create a
difficult political dynamic where public expenditures take a stop and go pattern. The next
section in this thesis explores this issue in greater depth, but I found the topic also relevant
to the Disease phenomenon. Ellman (1981) argues that expanding public sector was more
detrimental to the Dutch economy than the adverse effects on manufacturing from real
appreciation. Procyclical fiscal policy seems to be especially pronounced in developing
countries reliant on natural resources for revenue. The logic is simple: in times of price
booms governments enjoy income windfalls. Unable to resist temptation or political
pressures, they increase fiscal spending proportionally or even more than proportionally.
They try to do too much too soon overextending the fiscal expenditures. Several past
studies of commodity-dependent Latin American and Middle Eastern governments have
shown positive correlation between commodity booms and spending booms (Cuddington
1989; Sinnott 2009).
There are two significant fiscal expenditures that dominate procyclical fiscal spending: the
government wage bill and investment projects. Frankel (2010) argues that problem is the
perverse tendency for oil exporters to respond to high oil prices by increasing the number
of workers employed by the state and their rate of compensation - and then, when oil
prices fall, to face the painful and unpopular necessity of cutting back on the public sector
wage bill. Over the period 1974-1997, his study shows high positive correlation between
the price of oil and the government wage bill in Mexico, Venezuela and Iran. Interestingly
Norway shows no such correlation possibly because of mature political institutions that
shield against such effect. Increasing the wage bill and the number of workers is simple in
light of price booms. It is much harder to revers it and cut back when prices go down. For
instance, Frankel (2009) illustrates this point by examining the public sector wage bill in
Indonesia and Iran (two oil producers) against prices of oil over the preceding three years
during 1977-1997. The relationship is clearly positive even with a three year lag, which
indicates that public sector wage cuts are not easy to implement, and that it is not easy to
lay the workers off. With respect to the second type of fiscal expenditure, large scale
investment projects should arguably have a positive long-term effect on an economy if
well-designed. However, many countries seem to fall into trap when such investments are
stranded as soon as commodity prices go down because of insufficient funds required for
their completion and maintenance. Projects are then either abandoned entirely or
indefinitely postponed affecting long-term economic development.
All of the above factors contribute to the disease, which is primarily born out of the
temporary nature of commodity booms. Sooner or later, it seems, when revenues from
natural resources dry up, the country is left with uncompetitive export sector, expensive
and overextended government sector and a large debt that resulted from the excessive
borrowing from abroad to finance the development of the domestic commodity industry.
Even if the price bonanza prevails for a substantial period of time, the crowding out of
non-commodity exports is often harmful because the manufacturing sector has usually
greater externalities for long-term growth of a given country.
Problems with Governance and Power Struggles
While the Dutch Disease provides an economic analysis of the pressures and dynamics that
the reliance on a commodity production entails, a less quantifiable matter involves the type
and quality of governance, institutions and political actors in the resource endowed
countries. Often, the economic pressures of the Dutch Disease seem to be exacerbated by
the actions and polices of the state officials stemming from a deficient system of
governance. The examples of Norway and Botswana, on the one hand, and Nigeria and
Iran, on the other hand, show the differences of outcomes in a given country's economic
prosperity of its inhabitants. Such diverging outcomes seem highly related to the quality of
institutions that control the domestic natural resources. Statistically however, it is far less
ikely that an authoritarian oil country will transition to democracy than that a resource-
poor autocracy will. On average oil-rich governments spend two to 10 times more on their
militaries than countries without oil and are more prone to go to war. Most oil exporting
countries that do not have strong democratic institutions before they start exporting crude
inevitably create an inhospitable environment for democracy (Naim 2009).
Easy money, as has been extensively argued in the literature, can poison institutions-
possibly more when resource discoveries and booms materialize when the country's
institutions are already deficient-and weak institutions can in turn undermine growth
(Sinnott, Nash & de la Torre 2010). Norway and Botswana are two good examples of
countries with already developed systems of governance prior to the discoveries of
massive natural gas and gold reserves, respectively. One could as easily list countries
whose institutional makeup had been deficient prior to the resource discoveries, and which
stayed that way long after. In many autocratic countries the growing dependence on
commodities as a source of fiscal revenue has been matched by an increase in dependence
on commodity revenues to finance large increases in fiscal spending. Revenue windfalls
induce rent seeking behavior and lead to poor governance, which in turn inhibits
development of good institutions. Poor governance leads to lack of preparation in face of
price fluctuations, exponential spending (and expansion of the public sector) during boom
times and inefficient allocation of resources due to government patronage of the
commodity sector when commodity prices fall. The cycle is self-reinforcing making
attempts to remedy the situation all the more difficult.
Previous empirical studies have shown that economic dependence on oil and mineral is
correlated with authoritarian government (Barro 2000; Wantchekon 2002; Jenson &
Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2006) and that authoritarian regimes have lasted longer in
countries with oil wealth. However, this is not a rule. In case of Venezuela, for example,
the authoritarian regime had been already in power before oil development, and the
country transitioned to democracy during the production boom. The correlation of
authoritarian regimes and natural-resources-riches is particularly pervasive in the Middle
East and North Africa where the same ruling family or elite stays in power for decades.
The type of system of governance seems to bear high importance on what happens with the
commodity revenue windfalls. In countries where physical command of mineral or oil
deposits by the those in power automatically confers wealth on the them, there may be
lesser incentives to develop institutions and practices that define high quality systems of
governance, such as a strong rule of law and decentralization of decision-making. Such
high quality institutions are conducive to economic development, and their absence or
deficiency tends to have a negative impact on the level of development in a given country.
A study of 93 commodity producing countries during 1970-2007 by two IMF economist
Rabah Arezki and Markus Bruckner (2010), reveal that positive commodity price shocks
lead to a reduction of in the level of external debt5 in democracies, while no significant
reduction in external debt in autocracies. The external debt moves counter cyclically with
commodity prices in democracies, but in autocracies there is no significant relationship.
Such a phenomenon can be explained by the data that shows that the higher fiscal revenue
from the boom cycle corresponds to significantly higher government spending in
developing and emerging market countries:
In autocracies, windfalls from international commodity prices lead to a statistically
significant and quantitatively large increase in government spending. In
democracies on the other hand, the response in government spending to windfalls
from international commodity prices is quantitatively small and statistically not
significant. Hence, an examination of movements in government spending shows
that commodity price shocks were associated with a significant procyclicality of
s The average level of external debt in autocracies is not significantly different in the authors' sample from
the average level of external debt in democracies
government expenditures to international commodity price shocks in autocracies,
while in democracies government expenditures were acyclical. (Arezki & Bruckner
2010)
Karl (1997) further argues that:
Dependence on petroleum revenues produces a distinctive type of institutional
setting, the petro-state, which encourages the political distribution of rents. Such a
state is characterized by fiscal reliance on petrodollars, which expands state
jurisdiction and weakens authority as other extractive capabilities wither. As a
result, when faced with competing pressures, state officials become habituated to
relying on the progressive substitution of public spending for statecraft, thereby
further weakening state capacity. (Karl 1997)
Interestingly, the author's study shows that in democracies the commodity price windfalls
corresponded to improvements in the rule of law and real per capita GDP. In autocracies,
on the other hand, no such experience has been recorded in spite of significant increases in
governmental expenditures. In many of the commodity-rich countries this phenomenon is
pervasive. For example, in Latin America commodity producing countries derive on
average 24% of total fiscal revenues from sales of commodities compared to just 9% for
the advanced resource-rich economies (Sinnott, Nash & de la Torre 2010).
Krugman (1989) argues that high external debt levels effectively act as a tax on future
investment projects, and thus constrain the financing of these projects in the future.
Democracies use the revenue windfall from high commodity prices to reduce their external
debt levels while autocracies systematically fail to do so. Instead, the later directly spend a
large part of their additional revenues on government expenditures. Finally, Krugman's
study shows that such windfall reduced the risk of default on external debt in democracies,
and that such risk increased in autocracies.
But why would autocracies increase government spending in light of revenue windfalls?
In democracies the political process is more transparent. Would not then one expect
politicians in democracies to substantially increase government spending because of
electorate pressures associated with the election process? In democracies politicians would
rather focus on reducing external debt because it is a clear and transparent strategy that will
be associated with a lower tax on future investment projects. As a result:
Spending revenue windfalls on reducing external debt rather than increasing total
government expenditures should therefore be the preferred strategy by the majority
of citizens, and hence by the median voter, if there is a severe risk that revenue
windfalls from international commodity price shocks are sub-optimally
administered by the government. (Arezki & Bruckner 2010)
Since the politicians in democracies are more easily held accountable by the public, they
are pressured to spend more effectively. In autocracies, on the other hand, the way
spending is administrated is not very transparent. Autocratic leaders are much less
accountable to the citizens creating a space for abusing public office for private purposes.
Spending large chunks of commodity windfalls on government expenditures does not put
them under similar public scrutiny as it normally does in democratic systems where
government officials need to answer to the electorate or to independent government bodies
that have oversight over such expenditures. Strong democratic institutions successfully
constrain powerful groups from extracting transfers from the government budget.
The Islamic regime in Iran during 1980 to 1997 is an apt example of a vast misuse of
commodity-revenues by the state (Badiei & Bin 2002). Iran's economy depends on the
collection of revenues from a single commodity, oil. And oil is one of the commodities
whose price has been determined by the globalized markets. Following 1980s, the
government has allocated revenues from oil rents to unproductive activities and politically
motivated consumption expenditures. Presumably the goal of such revenue allocation was
to limit and contain potential internal uprisings and external threats. The government of
Iran has consistently channeled the commodity riches into all sorts of formal and informal
subsidies benefiting those interest groups that provided a sustained ideological and
material support for the regime in Iran. During the said period, the government failed to
accumulate capital and build up long-term investments.
It is easy to see that the higher the payoff that the commodity rents generate for those is
power, the higher the chance that the government will spend extra resources to ensure
retaining the power or being reelected (Robinson 2006). In moderate systems of
governance, this phenomenon will manifest itself in patronage of key stakeholders which
in turn may lead to inefficient resources allocation. A government that wants to maintain
power may use government expenditures to target important constituencies. It may, for
example, expan&4he public sector by hiring more civil servants or allocate money to "pork
barrel" projects. Shopping for votes can turn the commodity revenues into politically
expedient projects at a cost of economic growth.
In light of high unemployment levels and vast income inequalities that often plague
commodity-rich countries, governments, or rulers, have long resorted to food and fuel
subsidies as a way to keep the popular discontent at bay and to boost the dependence on
government services. In 2009, fuel subsidies amounted to roughly $150 billion in the
Middle East and North Africa. At that time oil cost just over $60 a barrel. It is easy to see
what happens when price of oil on the global markets shots up. In early 2011, the price
nearly doubled leading to regional fuel subsidies to rise to almost $300 billion per year
representing 7.5% of the area's GDP. One way to prevent such a jump in expenditures
would be to increase domestic fuel prices. However, oil-producing countries are likely to
charge lower domestic gasoline prices. The income obtained from upstream activities
subsidizes domestic downstream consumption. According to the Economist6 , as of March
2011, a liter of petrol at retail cost the consumer $0.20 in Saudi Arabia, under $0.10 in
Venezuela and $1 in Russia (and the U.S for that matter), while in Germany and the U.K.
consumers pay close to $2.5 per liter. Apart from modest subsidy cuts in Qatar and Iran,
no other Middle Eastern country has slashed the generous subsidies.
The tradition of splurging revenue windfalls on handouts to the public to buy off economic
discontent has been particularly pervasive since the toppling down of the Egyptian ruler
Mubarak in early 2011. Increasing wages in the public sector has been the most common
way. For example, Saudi Arabia boosted public-sector pay by 15% as part of extra $36
billion spending program. According to the Financial Times7 , the level of government
spending in Saudi Arabia is so high that in 2011 the price of oil will need to be at least at
$80 per barrel for the government just to balance its budget. Similarly, Egypt, Jordan,
Oman and Syria have followed the footsteps. In Syria and Jordan alone, the one-time
wage increase amounted to 0.4-0.8% of GDP. Kuwait, on the other hand, has offered free
6 "Throwing money at the street," The Economist, March 10, 2011
"Wells of anxiety," The Financial Times, March 29, 2011
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food to everyone for 14 months and $4000 per person. This is not to say that most of
these economies do not have the money to spend. Each $1 -a-barrel increase in the price of
oil adds about $3 billion to the Saudi treasury. Yet if the prices of commodities do in fact
fall in the future, such spending programs quickly become unsustainable. If they do, and if
the governments will need to curtail their lavish fiscal programs, popular discontent is sure
to ensue.
Another peculiar phenomenon besetting commodity-rich countries are low or nonexistent
taxes. Governments in such countries need not depend on taxing the population to
generate fiscal revenues - the resource sector provides revenues; hence, the leaders have
little incentive to be responsive and accountable to the taxpayers. Such an arrangement
may have freed those in power form the need for democracy. The need for tax revenue is
believed to require democracy under the theory "no taxation without representation." In
this case however there is ""no representation without taxation". The state's primary role
becomes distribution or allocation of revenues rather than extraction of income from
citizens. The government is relieved from political accountability that the taxation entails
and uses its role as distributor of wealth as a source of legitimacy. Question of democracy
is not a problem for such states. Money is the ultimate source of control, used to develop
the economy in a way that will maximize obedience, which is obtained by controlling the
structure of the market and the flow of funds (Okruhlik & Gwenn, 1999). Inhabitants in
turn have a parasitic links with the state. One could argue that the there is little incentive
for a person receiving monthly government checks to innovate and engage in
entrepreneurial pursuits. Rich parents sometimes spoil their kids. Mother Nature is no
exception (Gylfason 2006). Low or non-existent taxes and generous welfare programs
may also discourage groups from mobilizing around economic issues solidifying the power
of those on the top.
In countries with weak governance and large income inequality amongst the population,
controlling natural resources creates not only a significant pay off for those in power, but
also a large pay-off for those in a position to contest that power. Natural resources are
more easily appropriated by those in power than the output of the industrial sector or other
sources of wealth. Because of concentration of wealth in one sector that generates
substantial revenues such countries are prone to experience power struggles as the potential
challengers have strong incentives to topple the existing governing government, often
through violent means such as coup d'etats. The higher probability of losing power to a
successful challenger reduces the effective rate of return to investing in the country's
development for the existing elite, and may induce them to undersupply human capital,
infrastructure, contractual enforcement, and the rule of law (Caselli 2006).
For example, Nigeria, the world's top ten oil exporter, suffered eight successful coups
since gaining independence in 1960, the last one in 1993, amounting to two forceful
changes of government per decade. The nature of Nigerian power struggle shows the self-
interested, short-term motives of the group of individuals seeking control over the state:
by assuming power they become instantly recipients of fortunes. As the rulers remained in
power for short period of times, they tried to "get rich quickly" by accumulating vast
personal wealth, mostly in foreign accounts. The latest dictator, Sani Abacha, amassed a
fortune worth billions of U.S. dollars. Such self-interested dynamics of the ruling elite
leave little room to use the oil wealth to help the country industrialize and develop. With a
high forced government turnover ratio, those in power have no motivation to pass on
economic benefits that should flow from productive utilization of oil windfalls to future
leaders or the citizens.
Similarly, Hodler (2010) developed a model where natural resources lead to fighting
8among groups . Fighting in turn is assumed to reduce the protection of property rights, and
through this to reduce private investment. In addition, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
(2004) argue that abundant natural resources provide kleptocratic rulers with the resources
to buy off the opponents. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004),
Humphreys (2005) and Collier (2007, Chapter 2) all find that economic dependence on oil
and mineral wealth is correlated with civil war. Angola and Sudan are adequate examples
of this hypothesis. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) however argue that conflicts
increases dependence on resource extraction, rather than the other way around. Regardless
of the cause-effect relationship, the fact of the matter remains unchanged: natural resources
and the presence of power struggles and conflicts go hand in hand.
Rentier State and Rentier Economy
The concept of rentier state was first popularized by the economist Hussein Mahdavy who,
by looking at the examples of the Middle Eastern countries, argued that governments
8 Caselli and Coleman (2006) also present a model where natural-resource abundance can lead to fighting,
and lower incomes.
receiving significant oil revenues from abroad tend to become detached from their
societies, autocratic and unacceptable to their own citizens. The vast amounts of foreign
currency and credit generated from the oil industry flooded the state coffers and as a result
turned oil-producers in the Middle East into rentier states (ex. Kuwait, Quatar, Iran, Iraq).
One of the main characteristics of the rentier state is that the revenues come from abroad
and accrue directly to the state, and not to the private sector. Until mid-1970s virtually
every petroleum and mineral exploration company was a foreign owned multinational that
would repatriate the commodity economic rents. Since 1980s the dynamics changed as the
governments in many commodity-based developing states took measures to nationalize the
companies and capture the rent bounty. Historically, rents came from the exports of
precious and base metals and oil. Following Mahdavy's footsteps two economists, Hazim
Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, coined the term "rentier economy" arguing that the rentier
state is a subset of a rentier economy, and that the nature of the state is best examined
primarily through its size relative to that economy and the sources and structures of its
income. A rentier economy is an economy in which rent plays a major role, and in which
that rent is external to the economy.
The issue of the ownership change of the resources industries is an important one because
it posed harmful consequences to many developing countries. Foreign corporations had
the technological and industry know-how that acted as buffers to international market
shocks. With the governments taking over the commodity production, entire economies
became directly more exposed to export instabilities. The buffer that foreign
multinationals created was essentially gone. State ownership could have also induced the
tendency to over borrow to develop the capital intensive commodity infrastructure and
industry base (particularly in the energy exploration space). In the past, this cost would
have been primarily bared by the private sector. Finally, one could call into question the
inefficiencies of state-owned companies and the corresponding impacts on productivity.
Rentier-states derive most of their revenue from external sources, which in case of natural
resource-based economies are from the exports of the commodities, but it can also take
form of foreign aid. Such governments as a result are freed from the need to collect
income domestically in the form of taxes and hence become less accountable to the people
they govern. The pervasive incentives in rentier-state seem to explain the lack of
democratic pressures and weak record of economic development in many of the oil
exporters in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Mahdavy also suggests that
commodity rents make government officials risk-averse and prone to devote much of their
resources to protect the status quo rather than promote economic development. Similarly,
rentier states adopt policies that are exceptionally risk-averse, favoring "egalitarian current
consumption" over development policies that while furthering social and economic
transformation, risk provoking social conflict (Chaudhry1989). All these arguments have
at their core two nonobvious claims: first, that states are revenue satisficers, not revenue
maximizers; and, second, that when a state's demand for revenue diminishes, so will the
soundness of its economic policies. These theories conversely imply that states that are
revenue-poor and tax their populations more heavily will adopt sounder economic policies
and have better growth records (Deacon 2010).
As two recent papers on Brazil demonstrate, windfall rents may exacerbate the quality of
institutions. Caselli and Michaels (2009) find that the oil-driven increases in municipal
revenues and reported spending have not been accompanied by a commensurate
improvement in the welfare of people living in the municipalities. In particular, the
increase in municipal spending was not matched by a corresponding increase in the
provision of public goods and services, as recorded by household survey-based measures.
Observed increases in household income associated with royalty-induced government
revenues were negligible. What than happened to the oil revenues? The authors find
evidence that the revenues went disproportionately to municipal employees and were
partly accounted for by some degree of rent seeking and corruption. Similarly, Brollo,
Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2010) find empirical evidence that the large windfall
transfers to Brazilian municipalities seem to have induced more political corruption, as
measured by a random audit program.
Finally, Lane and Tornell (1997) point out that commodity windfalls may cause a "feeding
frenzy" in which competing groups fight for the natural resource rents thereby inefficiently
exhausting the public good. This effect is exacerbated by the direct accrual to the
government of a significant portion of the rents, possibly impeding the implementation of
needed structural reforms and sometimes distracting public officials from pursuing growth-
supporting policies.
Corruption
The issue of corruption seems to invariably flow from the discussion of the quality of
governance and the rentier economy. It is relevant because commodity abundance
translates into extremely high rents, and it will therefore likely create rent-seeking
behavior. Countries with weak governance systems that discover substantial resource
endowments are particularly at risk. For example, a developing country on its way to
economic development invests substantial financial and physical resources to develop
capital intensive natural resource projects. As the projects start bringing revenues the
lagging institutions are unable to keep apace creating fertile conditions that breed
corruption and unproductive activities. The system fosters relocation of talent from
productive to rent-seeking activities. Corruption (such as instances of bribery) enables the
most effective and efficient rent-seeking in those circumstances.
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2008) show that resource abundance increases corruption in
countries with poor democratic institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better
democratic institutions. Based on empirical data the authors found that the resource
abundance is positively associated only in countries that have endured a non-democratic
regime for more than 60% of the years since 1956. Resource-rich countries with long
history of democratic governments such as Norway or Australia do not succumb to
corruption to the same extent because the governments are directly accountable to the
people. In non-democratic countries there is a tendency for governments to be corrupt
because resource windfalls encourage rent-seeking, which in turn is left under little public
scrutiny. Hence, governments will tend to allocate the high financial windfalls at will
growing corrupt in the process of doing so. Naim (2010) gives an example of several
sovereign wealth funds and oil-stabilization funds adopted by countries to counteract the
negative effects of commodity-dependence such as price volatility, excessive fiscal
spending, indebtness and export-inhibiting appreciating exchange rates. Such funds seem
to rarely work especially when strong governance is lacking. The funds are either
exhausted prematurely or spent on poor investments. In fact, the presence of excessive
corruption usually entails high-levels of procyclical government spending of the revenue
windfalls.
An economy more open to trade (a higher value for trade openness), with stronger
institutions (a higher score for rule of law), and with a higher degree of political stability (a
lower value for political instability) would tend to have less corruption. The case of power
struggles and corresponding high level of corruption illustrates the how a poor institutional
make-up in a given country fosters rent seeking behavior. The state's interest is to capture
the rents, but often such behavior is paralleled by corruption. "Mines and oil- and gas
fields often involve high sunk costs and low variable costs, making them a tempting target
for expropriation." 9 Therefore, privatization and nationalization cycles usually follow
price cycles in commodities.
9 "It 's only natural," The Economist, September 9, 2010.
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Education Neglect
When researching the types of mistakes that resource rich countries tend to make the
prevailing literature on the topic ignores the importance of development of human
resources through a long-term sustained investment in education. Investment in human
capital seems essential in keeping the growth engine running for any country, let alone one
that is subject to high volatility in revenues and the possibility of eventual depletion of the
sources of revenues. Joseph Stiglitz puts it aptly:
You get older one year at a time, and no matter what innovations have occurred,
that process of ageing has not stopped. So therefore if you don't renew your human
capital, it depreciates just like physical capital depreciates ... In economies, you
have to run to stay still; that the world is changing, and you have to change even if
nothing else is going on. (Stiglitz 2010)
I found Gylfason's (2000) assessment of the issue particularly interesting. Statistics show
that school enrollment tends to be negatively correlated to natural resource endowments.
In late 1990s, secondary school enrollment amounted to 57% in OPEC countries against
64% in the world on average. OPEC counters would also spend about 1 % less of GNP
(about 4%) on education than for the world as a whole. Gylfason suggests that in many of
the commodity-rich countries the resource endowment is deemed most important at the
expense of human capital: "Their natural wealth may blind them to the need for educating
their children." The author further argues:
... resource-rich countries become overconfident and therefore tend to underrate or
overlook the need for good economic policies as well as for good education. In
other words, nations that believe that natural capital is their most important asset
may develop a false sense of security and become negligent about the accumulation
of human capital. Indeed, resource rich nations can live well of their natural
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resources over extended periods, even with poor economic policies and a weak
commitment to education. Awash in easy cash, they may find that education does
not pay. Nations without natural resources have a smaller margin for error, and are
less likely to make this mistake. (Gylfason 2000)
Without special policies and programs, resource-rich countries risk falling behind in terms
of population skill-sets and capabilities as compared to non-resource-based economies.
Commodity industries tend to be low-skill labor intensive (particularly mining, agriculture,
fisheries, forestry); there are however few expectations such as oil-drilling operations. On
average such countries run the risks of locking too many people in low-skilled industries
with little chances to advance their earning power and education, lagging the non-
commodity countries in terms of productivity and social mobility. A notable exception to
this dynamic is Botswana, which I will discuss in a greater detail in the next chapter. The
Botswana public officials seem to understand the long-term implications of neglecting the
development of human capital where expenditures on education relative to income are
amongst highest in the world. In the country where proceeds from a single luxury resource
account for more than one-third of GDP, 80% of exports and about half of the government
revenues, the importance of investing in human capital seem to be understood. Similarly,
Norway where government takes in about 80 percent of the oil rent through taxes and fees
boasts one of the highest college attendance numbers since the discovery of oil fields in
late 1970s. The proportion of collage attendees have been rising steadily from 26% inn
1980 to 62% in late 1990s.
Remedies for Resource-Based Economies
if one wants to achieve economic security, economic stability, sustainable development,
one has to engage in participatory processes in trying to absorb some of the lessons that
some of the other resource-rich countries have absorbed
- Jospeh Stiglitz
The previous section discussed many of the challenges and pitfalls that natural resource-
endowed countries face. Such riches by itself do not immediately confer good economic
performance nor oil, gold, copper or silver wealth need necessarily lead to inferior
economic or political development. There are ways through which most of the challenges
can be successfully mitigated and the commodity revenue windfalls turned into good uses
short-term and long-term. But the presence of such wealth resembles a double-edged
sword that if mishandled results in malady for the majority of inhabitants of a resource-rich
country rather than prosperity. The priority for any government should be to avoid the
dangers while taking advantage of the endowment so the curse turns into a blessing. It is
not an impossible task with countries like Norway, Botswan and Chile serving as models
of responsible resource management.
Because the role of the government is so important in managing the resource sectors in all
of the resource-rich countries, particularly those in the developing world, the monetary,
fiscal and legal tools are essential in mitigating the hardships described in the previous
chapter. Governments are key as they can diversify their export base and direct
investments to boost productivity in resource sectors to offset the decline in the terms of
trade; they can counteract the income volatility through fiscal policies and sovereign
wealth funds; they can mitigate the negative effects of the Dutch Disease by managing the
exchange rate, subsidizing non-commodity sectors and placing windfalls in foreign
currency to prevent the rapid appreciation of domestic currency. As Neary and van
Wijnbergen (1986) suggested:
In so far as one general conclusion can be drawn (from our collection of empirical
studies) it is that a country's economic performance following a resource boom
depends to a considerable extent on the policies followed by its government.
...Even small economies have considerable influence over their own economic
performance. (Neary & van Wijnbergen 1986)
There needs to be a comprehensive plan incorporating most if not all of the policies and
measures that are described in greater depth. There is not a single golden rule, but rather a
multitude of different measures that need to act in a concert with one another. In this
section, I begin my inquiry into the different methods of the resource curse management by
first exploring monetary and fiscal policies. I move later to the issue of good governance,
and conclude by proposing a multi-step framework for a responsible resource management.
Monetary Policy Response
The Dutch Disease can be remedied effectively by various governmental and monetary
practices. The combined effect of two outcomes that follow resource booms, i.e. the
appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by an increase in exports and the tendency to
crowd out non-commodity industries by drawing the capital and labor away rising their
production costs, can be counteracted by monetary and policy moves.
To remedy the volatile nature of commodity revenue flows that invariably affect the
exchange rate governments can set the exchange rate policy between fixed and floating
regime or a derivative of the two. They each have their advantages, and depending on the
size of the economy, trading patterns and importance of the natural resources endowment
in the economy, one should be preferable over the other. A price boom in commodity
markets should lead to the real exchange appreciation for commodity exporters while a
shock in terms of trade should have the opposite impact, i.e. a real devaluation. The major
advantage of the fixed regime is that it should reduce costs of trade and help central banks
achieve credibility in fighting inflation, which is an important factor for many of the
developing countries with weak governments. In such a regime the changes in the price of
commodities in global markets manifest themselves in forms of inflation (for real
depreciation) and deflation (for real appreciation). The fixed exchange rate regime seems
to be a better fit for commodity exporters that have open trade policies with a small non-
tradable sector and whose economies are relatively small. Such countries are not limited to
pegging their domestic currency to the dollar or euro. They can choose a basket of
currencies that reflects the diversity of their trading partners. Most of the Middle Eastern
oil producing countries and countries like Ecuador have adopted fixed regimes in the past
decade.
On the other hand, the main advantage of the floating exchange rate regime for a
commodity exporter is the automatic adjustment of the exchange rate in response to
commodity price volatility: during a price boom the currency appreciates and depreciates
when prices fall. Such a process should prevent the economy from overheating by
curtailing some of the excessive capital inflows. A commodity exporter with a large non-
tradable sector prone to experiencing shocks that are not symmetric to those in its main
trading partner and exposed to volatile terms of trade could be better off with a floating
exchange rate regime. A flexible currency should in principle help a country adjust more
quickly to the rapid price changes in the relevant commodity markets implying better
inflation management in the boom years. Chile and Mexico are examples of pure floating
commodity producers.
Because of the vast discrepancies in the domestic economic conditions and trading partners
of the commodity producers there is no one-size-fits-all exchange rate regime that
ameliorates the effects of the Dutch Disease on the real exchange rate. One interesting
option has been put forth recently by Frankel (2010) who advocates that commodity
exporters adopt Peg the Export Price (PEP) regime. The idea behind PEP is that the
monetary policy should keep the local-currency price of the export commodity stable on
daily basis. For example, if for an oil exporter the price of the commodity on international
markets go up by 1%, the dollar price in terms of local currency should also go up by 1%
making the local price of oil unchanged. Frankel argues that "PEP combines the best of
both worlds: it automatically accommodates terms of trade changes, as floating is supposed
to do, while simultaneously abiding by a pre-announced nominal anchor." The nominal
anchor here refers to inflation targeting. When one incorporates the PEP regime to the
examples of Indonesia and Russia in late 1990s, the simulations show that both of the
countries would undergo automatic currency depreciation when prices of oil dropped
without experiencing the actual currency crises.
The second Dutch Disease issue of crowding-out of other economic sectors, such as
manufacturing or agriculture, by the resource industries should be quite easily dealt with
by the government, at least in theory. Subsidies to the affected sectors (as long as not too
excessive) and taps on fiscal expenditures should prevent labor and capital from being
drawn away. Efforts to diversify the production structure of the economy and the export
profile should prove beneficial in the long-run. Several empirical studies have however
suggested that this phenomenon is not as pervasive as commonly deemed. A research by
Gelb (1990) of seven oil exporters during 1971-1983 price boom showed that only four
countries experienced the crowding-out effect. Other studies seem to point that the
manufacturing sector of mineral and oil exporters are unharmed by commodity export
booms. One would need to however examine the manufacturing sector to discern the
effects. For example, if the majority of the manufacturers import intermediate goods, a
currency appreciation would make their costs of production cheaper; hence their
competitiveness may not be damaged. In case of the agriculture on the other hand, the
negative effects seem to be more pronounced.
The example of Australia indicates the positive effects of the Dutch Disease where the shift
of labor and capital towards the booming minerals sector indicated a change in the
country's comparative advantage. The shift enabled Australia to enjoy higher income
through participation in the international trade. A reduction in aggregate income- did not
occur. Australia become a high-income country, based largely on its resource wealth.
From an economic perspective, the specialization brought about by Dutch disease is a
malady only to the extent that devoting a country's real resources to producing
commodities is in some way inferior to devoting them to producing something else, which
was not the case here (Sinnott, Nash & de la Torre 2010).
Fiscal Policy Response
One of the biggest challenges faced by resource abundant countries deals with the issue of
going on a spending spree once the commodity revenue windfalls hit the state coffers, i.e.
the excess in pro-cyclical government spending. Commodity revenues pose three
problems for the governments: response to short-term price volatility, long-term wealth
management and diversification of revenue base in case of the bust cycle. The central
issue when it comes to revenue allocation and management deals with the ability, or rather
inability, of state officials to put the money into use gradually over time to benefit the
public's welfare in the long-run. This situation is akin to a poor person winning a lottery.
More often than not, a poor person squanders the winnings because he/she does not know
how to manage it.
The issue takes on different forms depending on the nature of a given commodity
producer's governance structure. In democracies where policy horizons are often dictated
by short-term election cycles, those in power place little value in saving the revenue
windfalls for future consumption. Such governments often lack credibility to save today
and spend tomorrow. In autocratic regimes, on the other hand, commodity rents are more
likely to fall prey to corrupt officials, and more likely to be used as means to keep
population's in check.
To shield governments, state officials and politicians from the temptation or political
pressure of a pro-cyclical spending bonanza, a set of legally enforceable rules and peculiar
institutional arrangements need to be organized. The enforceability of such rules will
largely depend on the quality of legal institutions in a given country and the strength of the
rule of law. Chile provides an apt example of a commodity-exporter whose fiscal policy is
governed by a set of specific rules aimed at managing the cyclical budget surpluses. The
country has achieved what few of the resource-rich countries have been able to achieve:
pure countercyclical fiscal policy. As the world's biggest copper exporter, Chile has
adopted a set of budget targets depending on the copper revenues (originally the target was
a surplus of 1% of GDP, but then lowered to 0% in response to sharp price drops in 2009.)
Under Chilean rules there are two circumstances when the government can run a deficit
larger than the predetermined target: 1) during a recession when output falls by bigger than
expected, 2) when price of cooper is below a 10-year equilibrium (Frankle 2010).
Crucially, there are two panels of experts that meet mid-year to determine the 10-year
equilibrium price of copper and the output gap.
Such fiscal device has served Chile well. During the copper boom of 2003-2009, the
public pressure mounted on the expert panels to declare the rise in copper prices permanent
as a way to justify the need to increase the government spending proportionally to the
increasing export revenues. The panel did not yield and ruled the copper price boom
temporary. At the peak of prices in mid-2008, the Chilean fiscal surplus reached almost
9% allowing the country to pay down its debt to 4% of GDP and saving $20 billion, equal
to about 12% of GDP in the sovereign wealth fund. When prices drastically reversed in
late 2008 and early 2009, the government released some of the previously stored funds to
stimulate the wounded economy by spending an equivalent of 3% of GDP on a whole host
of programs. For example, as part of the fiscal stimulus in 2009, Chilean government
made one-time transfers of money to the poorest 40% of the population, which amounted
to about two months' worth of income. Chile was able to do so without running a budget
deficit thanks to savings accumulated in the boom times. . On a smaller scale, Bolivia,
Mexico and Peru have also saved part of their windfall gains from high commodity prices.
Modeled on Chile, Brazil's congress is considering a law according to which a chunk of
the revenue from the new deep-sea oilfields will be saved in a special social fund.
However, it is assumed that most of the windfall money will not be saved but rather spent
on education and anti-poverty programs.
A consequential and rigid policy is usually domestically unpopular. As a country enjoys
soaring income from commodity exports, few excess revenues trickle down to the people.
In June 2008, the president of Chile, Michele Bachelet, and the Finance Minister, Andres
Velasco, suffered one of the lowest approval ratings in the history of Chilean democracy.
Yet, as soon as the fortunes reversed and copper prices fell sharply, the country managed
to escape relatively unscratched one of the worst global economic recessions since the
Greta Depression. As expected, just one year later in mid-2009 the two state officials
enjoyed the highest approval ratings of any President and Finance Minister.
The legal framework stipulating budget surplus targets and providing legitimacy to the
expert panels were proved to be very effective tools. Such measured combined another
feature that is often found in successful resource producers: commodity and sovereign
wealth funds. Given the price volatility and the risk of depletion of natural resources
establishing a commodity fund to save some of the excess revenues for a rainy day is a
wieldy used and an essential policy tool.
Case of Norway - Sovereign Wealth Fund
Norway with population of 4.9 million is considered one of the wealthiest countries in the
world. Norway ranks as the second wealthiest country in the world in monetary value,
with the largest capital reserve per capita of any nation. However until 1970s, few
envisioned that this country would in just 30 years turn to be a model for other countries to
follow.
Norway has historically dependent primarily on agriculture and fisheries. It was one of the
worst hit economies post WWI and post WWII. As a small open economy that historically
thrived on international trade, the post-war recessions hit the country hard. Its largest
trading partners UK and Sweden were weak. Secondly, the combination of strong and
mostly pro-cyclical inflationary monetary policy between 1914 and 1920 and thereafter a
hard deflationary policy made the crisis even worse. It would be naive to assume that
Norway owes its current economic success exclusively to a discovery of vast petroleum
resources at the Ekofisk field, positioned as part of the Norwegian continental shelf, in
1959 by Philips Petroleum. Examples abound of countries lagging in terms of
development and standard of living that possess equivalent resource endowments. Rather,
for Norway it was the 20 year preceding the resource discovery where one can clearly see
an impressive track record of responsible economic planning and fiscal management. The
so-called golden era of the Norwegian economy between 1950 and 1970, has seen an
annual growth of GDP per capita of 3.3%, increased foreign trade, almost nonexistent
unemployment and tame inflationary pressures. The core of the Nordic model with a large
public sector delivered social security and evenly-distributed wealth, but it did not
necessarily give very high economic growth. The Norwegian growth rate in the period
was lower than that for most western nations. But the Norwegians had already established
good economic planning, an experience of which would prove crucial in managing the
natural-resource period that followed.
The effects of the discovery of the vast oil and gas reserves in the North Sea have not
however allowed Norway to fully escape the Dutch Disease. While the government's
countercyclical fiscal spending policy following the 1973 oil price shocks helped the
country avoid succumbing to a prolonged recession and the slow growth experienced by
other developed economies (the country in fact recorded higher economic growth and
lower unemployment levels in 1970s than in most other Western countries), Norway lost
significant competitive power in the international markets. The procyclical spending
policy concentrated on doling out subsidies to Norwegian companies making such firms
respond more to the changing government policies rather than competitive pressures in the
market. A vast number of Norwegian firms started to lag behind foreign counterparts in
terms of productivity resulting in a large-scale deindustrialization.
The rising prices of petroleum products in late 1970s and early 1980s translated into
significant growth of the energy sector and rapid crowding out of manufacturing. The high
oil revenues pushed labor costs high in the oil sector, which in turn spilled over to other
sectors making Norwegian exports less competitive. The country suffered a much quicker
pace of deindustrialization than its major trading partners. While the country was
unsuccessful escaping the main threats of the Dutch Disease, smart government planning
and long-term policy view enabled the country to maximize the benefits of the generous,
albeit volatile, energy sector shifting its comparative advantage away from non-oil
industries.
Ever since the 1959 discovery, oil and gas production has been a big part of the Norwegian
economy. Nowadays, export revenues from oil and gas amount to 45% of total exports
and constitute more than 20% of the GDP. While not a member of OPEC, Norway is the
fifth largest oil exporter and third largest gas exporter in the world. What sets Norway
apart from the majority of other commodity producers in the Middle East, North Africa
and Latin America is not necessarily almost absolute control of the industry by the
government (this trend prevails worldwide), but rather the quality of windfall revenue
management system and the responsible (and more importantly consequential) policy
planning related to the oil/gas industry. The Norwegian government controls licensing of
exploration and production of all the fields. It holds major ownership stakes in the big
energy players in the country: 65% stake in Statoil, 100% stake in Petoro and SDFI.
Established in 1995 the Government Pension Fund ("Fund") is the main tool for the oil/gas
revenue management. Its main objective is the equitable distribution across generations of
the natural resource income achieved by minimizing uncertainty from volatile commodity
revenues and reduction of the possibility of over-heating in economy during boom cycles.
The Fund is funded with revenues from oil/gas sales, taxation on the resource-related
activities, dividends from the investments that the Fund makes and licensing fees. Valued
at $500 billion 2010, it is world's second largest sovereign wealth fund in 2010. The
savings accumulated in the Fund equal the Norwegian GDP and are the largest capital
reserve per capita of any nation. According to conservative estimates the fund may reach
$900 billion by 2017.
The value of the Fund is not only correlated to the increasing petroleum windfalls but also
to the value of the investments that are made with the Fund's capital. Up to a maximum of
60% of the Fund's capital can be invested in the shares of companies outside of Norway
with the remaining placed in bonds and real-estate. The investments are made with a long-
term horizon in a diversified portfolio with less liquid and riskier assets constituting major
portfolio weightings. There are many guidelines and rules that govern the management
and investment process of the Fund. For instance, the interest and dividends from the
Fund's investments are used to balance the structural, non-oil deficit in bad times, while
the principal can only be used to cover future pension liabilities. In addition, strict
budgetary guidelines prevent the state officials from overspending the Fund's riches during
difficult times. Currently, the government can use up to 4% of the Fund each year.
The mere existence of a sovereign wealth fund does not guarantee restrained fiscal
spending during boom cycles and responsible spending in the bust cycles. Russia has used
Norway's Fund as a model for managing its own commodity revenues, yet it has not been
nowhere near as successful succumbing to short-term political pressures and an opaque
investment process. Even with a clearly stated objective of long-term saving policy, good
intentions are necessarily but not sufficient. Many other factors come into play. Norway
had a track record of responsible fiscal and monetary policies prior to the discovery of the
petroleum wealth in 1959. The massive wealth windfalls have shifted the country's
comparative advantage to the energy sector, but other factors enabled the country to sustain
a long-term economic growth. Davis, Ossowski, and Fedelino (2003) credit Norway's
"mature democracy and strong, consensus-oriented parliamentary institutions as key
factors behind [the] outcome." Sinnott, Nash and de la Torre (2010) argue that:
The country benefits from a broad societal understanding of the need to restrain
public spending and avoid volatile expenditure patterns. Transparent political and
bureaucratic processes and stable policies that incorporate long-term considerations
contribute to the prudent fiscal outcomes. Prudence and long-time horizons for
managing windfall commodity rents are arguably easier to achieve where private
enterprise thrives. A strong and efficient private sector that perceives broad
opportunities to engage in productive enterprise is less likely to engage in rent-
seeking activities. (Sinnott, Nash and de la Torre 2010)
But Norway is just one example of a commodity fund. The oldest and biggest funds
belong to the Middle Eastern oil and gas exporters - Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
Out of twenty countries in the world with the biggest sovereign wealth funds, twelve are
strictly commodity-based. Mere creation of a fund will not guarantee that short-term
oriented politicians or corrupt government figures will keep their hands off the saved
commodity windfalls. The funds need to be transparent and governed by a clearly defined
set of rules and restrictions spelling out the specific circumstances under which commodity
revenues are to be saved, invested or spent. Humphreys and Sandhu (2007) recommend
that spending choices are part of the official governmental budget, so they do not become
any politicians' private "slush funds." To avoid short-term pressures from the political
cycles in democracies and public discontent in non-democratic regimes in earmarking the
commodity revenues for specific good causes such as education, health, or retirement
support for a future generation should prove an effective policy choice. If people know
how and when the money is spent, they should be more tolerant of the countercyclical
spending policies and have grater oversight over potential transgressions by state officials.
Additional Measures - Reserves Accumulation, Capital Inflows Restrictions and
Permanent Funds
In addition to sovereign wealth funds or commodity funds, there are additional ways for
countries to save during commodity price booms and spend when the resource revenues
dry up. One of the measures involves accumulation of foreign reserves by central banks
through the exchange intervention. The goal is to smooth spending over time. Yet many
economist shave deemed this method a suboptimal choice because of low returns and
potential inflationary pressures. Such foreign reserves would earn low yields because they
would primarily be riskless bonds such as the US treasury bills. Increasing foreign
reserves on the central bank's balance sheet would need to lead to a monetary expansion
and hence inflation. Frankel (2010) argues that in the event of excessive foreign reserves,
a central bank should sell some of it to the country's commodity fund/sovereign wealth
fund. Such a move should be however dependent on whether such a fund is politically
independent. In case that it does not have independence, and the central bank does, foreign
reserves should be kept unsold where they cannot be easily raided. Furthermore, in case of
excessive foreign reserves buildup, a government should consider lifting any restrictions
(or even encourage) of its citizens to invest abroad. Similarly, a country could also place
capital inflow controls shielding itself from the possibility of overwhelming the domestic
economy. For example, Brazil has introduced a range of targeted capital controls since
2009 to discourage short-term speculative flows.
Finally, an interesting example of preventing the government from making choices as to
what to spend the commodity windfalls on is illustrated by the Alaskan Permanent Fund.
While the earnings from the Alaskan oil sector flow directly to the Fund, it is mandated
under the state law that half of such earnings are to be distributed to the local population on
per capita basis. The idea is that people know better how to spend the money than the
government. Similar approach has been recently proposed for resource windfall
management in Nigeria and Iraq (Subramanian 2003; Birdsall & Subramanian 2004)
Potential Solutions to Governance Deficiencies
Monetary and fiscal measures aimed at shielding countries from the many challenges faced
by relying too much on the resource production and exportation are rather easily defined
and have been tested historically in a number of commodity-based states. As I have
discussed above, a commodity-producing country has numerous weapons at its disposal to
fight off the resource curse. Any state can adopt policies dealing with the excessive and
volatile nature of commodity cycles modeled on policies of such successful commodity
managers as Chile or Norway. The inability of many states to live up to the potential that
the resource endowments can bestow upon them comes down to factors that are more
difficult to define and that go against some of the basic human instincts. The type of
governance and the attitudes of those in power are usually highly indicative whether the
resource wealth turns into a cure or a blessing. For example, how would one change the
culture of power struggles, rent-seeking and corruption in Nigeria so that responsible
management of oil revenues can benefit citizens domestically?
Even in less extreme cases many of the difficulties in optimal management of the
commodity incomes come down to the credibility of governments handling the windfalls.
If citizens do not trust state officials' promises to manage the wealth responsibly and save
for the future, they will not support decisions of the government to keep the wealth
untapped for the possible future disbursement when the commodity cycle enters a down
cycle. In such a climate the resources will most likely be overexploited, the excess
revenue spent in the short-term and rents unevenly distributed and unfairly dissipated. In
Latin America, to give an example, high income inequality stemming from uneven
distribution of commodity windfalls has resulted in failure to accumulate social and human
capital, interfering with sustained growth and economic diversification (Leamer 1999). In
such conditions, long-term wealth creation will not materialize and the country will
continuously be subject to the danger of the boom-bust cycles. How would than a country
break such a cycle, and how would a government gain the much needed credibility?
Further questions linger: how to make countries turn the revenues into savings and
productive investments? How not to give out energy subsidies but spend that amount on
education and development of human and physical capital?
If governments are unable to improve internally, strict external measures can be placed to
help them stir in the right direction. One example would be the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) announced in 2002 by, then, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.
The framework mandates participating governments and oil companies to disseminate
detailed information on quantities extracted, revenues, signature bonuses, and royalties
paid to the governments in commodity-abundant regions. Most of the time, host countries
lack technological know-how and physical capital to extract the resource wealth, and need
assistance from the big energy multinationals, foreign governments and international
organizations such as the IFC. The EITI's goal is to target the lack of accountability and
transparency in exploration and sales activities so the development of a given country's
resource base does not exacerbate poor governance and lead to corruption, conflict and
poverty.
In light of government's lack of credibility, other external measures have been successfully
incorporated. For example, the World Bank has conditioned its financing of the Chad-
Cameroon oil pipeline that the money paid to the government is put into an escrow account
and its destination scrutinized by an oversight committee. The agreement also stipulated
that Chad would spend 72% of its oil export earnings on poverty reduction such as health,
education and infrastructure building, and put aside 10% in a "future generations fund."
The energy multinational involved in the project, ExxonMobile, was to deposit the oil
revenues in an escrow account at Citibank and the government was to spend them subject
to oversight by an independent committee . Similarly, the IMF has exerted pressure on
governments to be more transparent about the uses of their resource windfalls so to
discourage the resource royalties from being appropriated by the ruling elite for its own
benefit. In countries with a history of violent power struggles, such initiatives aim at
lessening the incentives for potential challengers to stage a coup d'etat by diminishing the
pay-offs of those in power.
Countries with poor institutions would benefit from establishing a mechanism akin to the
Chilean expert panels. The details governing the workings of the panels should be
formalized into law and the panel's members given legal independence. The members
should be further protected by laws shielding them from arbitrary firings (similar to the
laws protecting heads of independent central banks). Such an arrangement should enforce
the separation of decision-making powers between the members of the panels and
politicians. The former would determine the total amount of spending while the latter
would determine the allocation of resources. Finally, based on my research of the resource
curse the quality of regulation, such as the predictability of changes of domestic laws, as
' Sadly, once the money started rolling in, the government of Chad reneged on the agreement.
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well as anticorruption policies, such as accountability and transparency in the public sector,
are important factors for effective natural resource management and growth.
Case of Botswana - Good Governance
Botswana , until 1966 a British colony, boasts currently one of Africa's most dynamic
economies. The country's rich mineral deposits, particularly diamonds, have historically
been the main drivers of economic expansion. In 2002, Botswana exported $2 billion
dollars' worth of diamonds, nickel, gold, and other natural resources. With diamond
mining alone accounting for nearly 30% of GDP, close to 80% of export earnings and a
half of government's revenues, how has this small country in one of the most improvised
and violent continents been able to escape the natural resource curse? Governance alone, it
seems, determines the extent to which growth effects of the commodity wealth can
materialize. Botswana's high quality institutions, particularly in the private property area,
have stemmed from the limited British colonialism, strong political leadership since
independence, and the country's elite's motivation to support the strong institutional make-
up of the country. The country has succeeded in developing a solid institutional structure -
something that the majority of resource based economies failed to do (Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson 2002).
Good government policies and a sound long-term development plan have served Botswana
well in driving the remarkable economic performance. The country has been able to avoid
many of the effects of the resource curse, and managed to redirect the resource windfalls
into investments in healthcare and education. Effective anticorruption laws and high level
of public engagement have also placed government officials under close scrutiny and
forced them to be more transparent about how the country's natural resources wealth is
spent and distributed. The country's main diamond company, Debswana, is owned equally
by the government of Botswana as well as the De Beers Group, an international family of
companies dominating the diamonds business. Debswana's involvement in the country is
not limited to the mineral exploration. The company invests in the local communities by
building hospitals, schools, and recreational facilities for employees and local residents.
Because virtually every aspect of the diamond production (mining, cutting, polishing,
manufacturing and trade) is done from within Botswana, the country retains most of the
revenues coming from the diamonds business. Other diamond-rich countries derive wealth
purely from rough diamonds exports; the total revenues are therefore much smaller.
limi (2006) credits four aspects of governance for the successful natural resource
management in Botswana. First, voice and accountability measured by the political
process, civil liberties, and political rights. Those in authority for resource extraction, as
well as the process by which they are selected and replaced, are scrutinized by the public.
limi states that "Botswana has done particularly well on this aspect of governance;
international observers praised as free and fair the 2004 national election, the first
conducted under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) guidelines for
democratic elections. " (limi 2002). The second aspect of governance deals with
government effectiveness measured by the quality of public services and the competence
of civil servants. Botswana scores high on this front. The government officials are
entrusted with and held accountable for implementing good resource management
practices. Botswana follows a self-disciplinary rule, the Sustainable Budget Index,
according to which resource revenues are to finance development expenditure and
continuous spending on health and education. This rule has been broadly followed for
decades. Additionally, there is a government asset fund, the Pula Fund, where financial
assets are invested only on a long-term basis in a transparent and accountable manner.
Botswana shines away from market unfriendly practices such as price controls and
excessive regulatory burden. The country's officials place much value in developing a
long-term working relationship with the private sector. The diamond-mining leases are
held for 25 years and contracts related to natural resources extended for more than 10
years. Finally, Botswana has strong anticorruption policies ensuring fair and transparent
distribution of the resource revenues. Established in 1994, an independent anticorruption
authority called the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime, has the authority to
report corruption cases directly to the president. The constitution of Botswana establishes
the attorney general independent of the government and politicians. Due to the sound
anticorruption framework corruption in the public sector has not been a serious problem in
Botswana.
Natural Resources Management Framework
I have synthesized the concepts discussed in details above into a list of eight intertwined
ideas that could act as a framework for commodity producing countries to respond to the
challenges of the resource curse and increase chances of a long-term economic success.
They are as follows
1. Pick an exchange rate regime according to the country's economic size and make-
up and the diversity of trading partners
2. Domestic currency appreciation is acceptable and controllable through capital
inflow controls and increase in foreign exchange reserves;
3. Either shift comparative advantage to the exploitation of the commodities or
diversify and support non-commodity sectors;
4. Set budget targets;
5. Emulate Chile in setting up a mechanism for countercyclical spending dynamics,
and give an independent panels of experts rather than politicians power to
determine the budget targets;
6. Emulate Norway in setting up a sovereign wealth fund or a commodity fund and
follow Norway's investment strategy;
7. Emulate Botswana in setting a framework for anticorruption measures and
standards of governance;
8. Set up long-term policies stipulating commodity revenues to be invested in
education and development of the human capital.
Conclusion
Oil creates the illusion, of a completely changed life, life without work, life for free... The
concept of oil expressed perfectly the eternal human dream of wealth achieved through
lucky accident.. .In this sense oil is afairy tale, and like every fairy tale a bit of a lie.
- Ryszard Kapuscinski
The resource curse is multidimensional in nature. It is not solely an economic distortion of
the Dutch Disease, which stipulates over-reliance on a single commodity exports and the
damaging effects it has on the terms of trades and crowding out of non-resource sectors.
Nor is it simply a matter of inadequate institutional framework, corrupting rents or higher
levels of political instability resulting from potential high pay-offs to the winner. Each of
these considerations is important, and each needs to be taken into consideration when
devising a game plan to avoid the many pitfalls that the resource endowments entail.
Through my inquiry I have become convinced that the mere discovery of resource wealth
is not a problem in and of itself. Rather, it is the failure of governments or ruling elites to
mitigate the dangers that accompany such gifts of nature. Responsible policies can turn
abundant natural resource riches into an unmitigated blessing. Yet, responsible policies, as
few resource-rich countries show, are usual byproducts of democratic governments,
transparent institutions and high civil involvement. But such preconditions in places where
none of them exist demand sacrifices to build the defenses against the curse from those in
power as well as from those governed. In the majority of resource-rich countries, it seems
that this is simply too much to ask.
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